Optimal service contract under cost information symmetry/asymmetry

Title
Optimal service contract under cost information symmetry/asymmetry
Authors
Keywords
service outsourcing, service quality, incentive theory, optimal contract
Journal
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY
Volume 67, Issue 2, Pages 269-279
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Online
2015-04-22
DOI
10.1057/jors.2015.25

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