Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009–2010 Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic in France

Title
Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009–2010 Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic in France
Authors
Keywords
Individual vaccination, Mean field games, Vaccine scares, SIR model, Epidemic control, Nash equilibrium, 49, 62P10, 92B05
Journal
BULLETIN OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY
Volume 77, Issue 10, Pages 1955-1984
Publisher
Springer Nature
Online
2015-10-07
DOI
10.1007/s11538-015-0111-7

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