Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009–2010 Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic in France

标题
Individual Vaccination as Nash Equilibrium in a SIR Model with Application to the 2009–2010 Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic in France
作者
关键词
Individual vaccination, Mean field games, Vaccine scares, SIR model, Epidemic control, Nash equilibrium, 49, 62P10, 92B05
出版物
BULLETIN OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY
Volume 77, Issue 10, Pages 1955-1984
出版商
Springer Nature
发表日期
2015-10-07
DOI
10.1007/s11538-015-0111-7

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