Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures

Title
Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures
Authors
Keywords
Assignment games, Infrastructure, Non-linear pricing, Market power, Negotiations, C78, L10, L14, D43, R10
Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
Volume -, Issue -, Pages -
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Online
2019-09-27
DOI
10.1007/s00182-019-00695-z

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