Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures

标题
Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures
作者
关键词
Assignment games, Infrastructure, Non-linear pricing, Market power, Negotiations, C78, L10, L14, D43, R10
出版物
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
Volume -, Issue -, Pages -
出版商
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
发表日期
2019-09-27
DOI
10.1007/s00182-019-00695-z

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