4.6 Article

Contract Structure, Risk-Sharing, and Investment Choice

Journal

ECONOMETRICA
Volume 81, Issue 3, Pages 883-939

Publisher

WILEY
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA9100

Keywords

Investment choice; informal insurance; risk-sharing; contract design; microfinance; experiment

Funding

  1. Russell Sage Foundation
  2. George and Obie Shultz Fund
  3. National Science Foundation
  4. Economic and Social Research Council
  5. Economic and Social Research Council [ES/H010742/1] Funding Source: researchfish
  6. ESRC [ES/H010742/1] Funding Source: UKRI

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Few microfinance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure of existing microfinance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected-return investments. To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal risk-sharing, and formal financial contracts. I then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large microfinance institution in India. The experiments confirm the theoretical predictions that joint liability creates two potential inefficiencies. First, borrowers free-ride on their partners, making risky investments without compensating partners for this risk. Second, the addition of peer-monitoring overcompensates, leading to sharp reductions in risk-taking and profitability. Equity-like financing, in which partners share both the benefits and risks of more profitable projects, overcomes both of these inefficiencies and merits further testing in the field.

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