Journal
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
Volume 69, Issue 12, Pages 2557-2567Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.07.032
Keywords
Common pool resources; Governance; Marine protected areas; Co-management; Experimental economic games; Fisheries; Latin America
Funding
- Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program (LACEEP)
- Colombian Institute for the Development of Science and Technology (COLCIENCIAS)
- American National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- Center for Economic Development Studies (CEDE) at the Universidad de los Andes
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Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPRs) threaten governance at some marine protected areas (MPAs). In this paper, using economic experimental games (EEGs), we investigate the effects of internal communication, external regulation, and the interaction between internal regulation and non-coercive authority intervention-what we call co-management-on fishermen's extraction decisions. We perform EEG with fishermen inhabiting the influence zone of an MPA in the Colombian Caribbean. The results show that co-management exhibits the best results, in terms of both reduction in extraction and resource sustainability, highlighting the importance of strategies that recognize communities as key actors in the decision-making process for the sustainable use and conservation of CPR in protected areas. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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