Journal
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Volume 181, Issue 1, Pages 591-601Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-010-0789-8
Keywords
Cooperative game theory; Core; Mathematical programming; Lot sizing
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The core is a set-valued solution concept for cooperative games. In situations where the characteristic function is not monotone the classical definition may not be sufficient. Hence, we propose a subset of the core that is called subcoalition-perfect core. It will be proven that the subcoalition-perfect core coincides with the set of non-negative core allocations. Furthermore, an ellipsoid algorithm is provided which may be applied in many applications to compute an element in the subcoalition-perfect core. In addition, we discuss an application where the characteristic function is not monotone and perform a computational study.
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