Journal
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION
Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages -Publisher
ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY
DOI: 10.1145/2086696.2086714
Keywords
Design; Security; Performance; Side-channel attacks; shared caches; secure architectures
Funding
- Air Force Research Laboratory [FA8750-09-1-0137]
- National Science Foundation [CNS-1018496, CNS-0958501]
- Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr
- Division Of Computer and Network Systems [1018496] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
- Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr
- Division Of Computer and Network Systems [0958501] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
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We propose a flexibly-partitioned cache design that either drastically weakens or completely eliminates cache-based side channel attacks. The proposed Non-Monopoliz able (NoMo) cache dynamically reserves cache lines for active threads and prevents other co-executing threads from evicting reserved lines. Unreserved lines remain available for dynamic sharing among threads. NoMo requires only simple modifications to the cache replacement logic, making it straightforward to adopt. It requires no software support enabling it to automatically protect pre-existing binaries. NoMo results in performance degradation of about 1% on average. We demonstrate that NoMo can provide strong security guarantees for the AES and Blowfish encryption algorithms.
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