Understanding Deep Disagreement

The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements - i.e. disagreements concerning clashes of one's hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements insofar as there can be a specific class of hinge commitments that are axiological in nature, thereby lending further support to the axiological account of deep disagreement.

Automated summary

This article describes and defends the axiological account of deep disagreements, which understands the notion of disagreement in terms of the existential importance of the topic. It argues that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. The proposal is compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements, and it claims that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements if there can be a specific class of axiological hinge commitments.