Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions

We have controversial intuitions about the rightness of retributive punishment, keeping promises for its own sake, and pushing the heavy man off of the bridge in the footbridge trolley case. How do these intuitions relate to ethical theories? Should ethical theories aim to fit with and explain them? Or are only uncontroversial intuitions relevant to explanatory ethical theorising? I argue against several views that we might hold about the relationship between controversial intuitions and ethical theories. I then propose and defend the view that ethical theories should only aim to fit with and explain the intuitions that almost all people (who minimally understand the relevant issues) share. I argue that this view has interesting and important implications for ethical theorising and theorising about justice and equality.

Automated summary

This article discusses the controversy surrounding retributive punishment, promises made for their own sake, and the footbridge trolley case, and proposes that ethical theories should aim to fit with and explain the intuitions shared by almost all people. The author argues that this view has interesting and important implications for ethical theorizing and theorizing about justice and equality.