Article
Computer Science, Information Systems
Po-Chu Hsu, Atsuko Miyaji
Summary: An auction is a common method used to sell limited resources in modern society. M+1st-price auction sells M identical goods to B bidders, and the top M winners can buy the goods at the M+1st-price. Bidders send their bids secretly as a bit-slice bidding vector to a trusted manager, but the bidding vector's length also limits the upper bound of a bid.
Article
Economics
David Evans, Andrew Reeson
Summary: This study examines the performance of government agencies procuring ecosystem services from private landowners through repeated discriminatory price auctions using an agent-based model. Findings show that the discriminatory mechanism deteriorates over time relative to the uniform mechanism as bidders learn; minimal changes in bidders' price expectations have a significant impact on the mechanisms' relative performance; the system's price paths exhibit high stochasticity and path dependency.
ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS
(2022)
Article
Economics
Marc Ivaldi, Milena Petrova, Miguel Urdanoz
Summary: This study uses a novel method to examine the impact of airline alliances on the distribution of airfares, and finds that airline alliances can reduce the average price level and dispersion of airfares due to lower cost variability.
Article
Hospitality, Leisure, Sport & Tourism
Gaurav Malhotra
Summary: The Indian Premier League (IPL) is the most successful cricket tournament in India. This research aims to predict the auction price of players using key quantitative variables. By comparing the auction price with the actual performance of players, this study provides insights on the economic value of players. Additionally, the model used in this study helps team owners understand the value added by players.
JOURNAL OF SPORTS ANALYTICS
(2022)
Article
Management
Thomas Nedelec, Clement Calauzenes, Vianney Perchet, Noureddine El Karoui
Summary: This article addresses the issue of improving bidders' strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions and introduces a simple and generic method for designing novel bidding strategies. The proposed method guarantees an increase in utility and is applicable to any distribution of competition.
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
(2022)
Article
Neurosciences
Alaa Al-Mohammad, Wolfram Schultz
Summary: Economic choice involves eliciting the subjective values of the choice options. Traditional animal value estimation methods are complex and do not capture the immediacy of individual choices. This study implemented a simple auction-like mechanism called BDM in monkeys, demonstrating its feasibility for meaningful value estimation of liquid rewards.
JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE
(2022)
Article
Economics
Simona-Vasilica Oprea, Adela Bara
Summary: A blockchain trading mechanism is proposed to simulate electricity transactions for a community of modern smart houses with over 300 appliances and multiple PV systems. Different trading mechanisms are implemented to evaluate the benefits and efficiency of Local Electricity Market transactions.
Article
Mathematics
Ziyi Tan, Shulin Liu
Summary: This paper generalizes the models of the standard first- and second-price auctions by using the Cobb-Douglas function to evaluate bidders' bidding preferences. The findings suggest that bidders have different preferences for the probability of winning and the profit conditional on winning, which impact bidding behavior and the optimal reserve price.
Article
Business, Finance
Paresh Kumar Narayan
Summary: Based on hourly data, it was found that the phenomenon of price clustering in the oil market is more significant during the COVID-19 period, with up to 30% of the behavior attributed to the pandemic. Additionally, a simple technical trading strategy showed no evidence of profitability in the oil market during the COVID-19 period.
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
(2022)
Article
Business, Finance
Jarl G. Kallberg, Crocker H. Liu, Adam Nowak
Summary: This article analyzes how the double round auction mechanism increases seller's expected revenue significantly. Through case studies, it is found that the bid in a double round auction is 8.4% higher than in traditional auctions, and the average bid increases by 3.7% from the first round to the second round.
REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS
(2021)
Article
Computer Science, Theory & Methods
Renhao Lu, Weizhe Zhang, Yan Wang, Qiong Li, Xiaoxiong Zhong, Hongwei Yang, Desheng Wang
Summary: To address the issues of data privacy and data heterogeneity in Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), we propose an Auction-based Cluster Federated Learning scheme (ACFL). The ACFL scheme intelligently clusters clients using a mean-shift clustering algorithm and selects clients to participate in federated learning training through an auction mechanism. We prove that the proposed clustered federated learning framework converges at a sublinear rate. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate that the proposed FL scheme outperforms conventional FL schemes in terms of convergence rate and energy balance.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
(2023)
Article
Business, Finance
Sahin Telli, Xufeng Zhao
Summary: This study investigates the clustering phenomenon in Bitcoin wallet balances by examining the Bitcoin rich list. Significant clustering is found in both the integer and fractional parts of the balances, particularly at 00. Using probit models, the study reveals that wallet age, number of transactions, and balance significantly impact clustering, with balance being the most influential factor. The findings suggest that economic and behavioral factors may contribute to the observed preference clustering among Bitcoin wallet holders. This study offers valuable insights into the behavior of Bitcoin users and lays the foundation for further research in this area.
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS
(2023)
Article
Computer Science, Hardware & Architecture
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu
Summary: This study proves that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of First Price Auctions is approximately 1 - 1/e(2), which is approximately 0.8647, closing the gap between the previously known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].
JOURNAL OF THE ACM
(2023)
Article
Economics
Javier Castro, Rosa Espinola, Inmaculada Gutierrez, Daniel Gomez
Summary: This paper introduces a new auction called the Draw auction, where a draw is implemented when a minimum price of sale is not reached. The study finds that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is achieved in the Draw auction when each player bids their true personal valuation. Furthermore, the expected profit for the seller in the Draw auction is shown to be greater than in second-price auctions, regardless of the presence of a minimum price. Computational tests demonstrate these results and show that the Draw auction's expected profit for the seller is nearly as good as the optimal auction, but with a simpler implementation than the Myerson auction.
COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS
(2023)
Article
Business, Finance
Christoph Frei, Joshua Mitra
Summary: The closing price is an important benchmark in financial markets, and its stability can be affected by different types of volume. Auction prices and volume weighted average prices are typically the optimal choices for determining the closing price, explaining the prevalence of these closing benchmarks on financial markets.
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS
(2021)
