Blame, Nudging, and the Actual Moral Relationship

T. M. Scanlon posits a universal moral relationship in response to the worry that his relational approach to blame cannot answer the question of how strangers can fittingly blame one another. However, commentators have noted that appealing to universal moral standards seems to explicitly deviate from a relational approach's basis in actual relationship norms. This paper argues that Scanlon's idea of a moral relationship can nevertheless provide a basis for response to the problem of strangers if we recognize that actual and ideal moral relationships both play a role within the relational approach. An interesting consequence of this recognition is that it seems to undermine the moral relationship's universality. However, a presumptive case for assuming the relationship exists even between strangers can be found in seeing our blaming practices as akin to public policy nudges, where blame operates like an opt-out choice architecture with respect to the moral relationship. On this understanding, though the moral relationship is escapable, individuals are naturally encouraged to participate through the expression of interpersonal attitudes that communicate relational norms and expectations.

Automated summary

T. M. Scanlon proposes a universal moral relationship to address the concern of how strangers can appropriately blame each other in his relational approach. However, it has been noted that appealing to universal moral standards deviates from the basis of actual relationship norms in this approach. This paper argues that Scanlon's idea of a moral relationship can still provide a basis for addressing the problem of strangers if both actual and ideal moral relationships are considered within the relational approach.