4.7 Article

Modelling and simulation of a four-group evolutionary game model for green innovation stakeholders: Contextual evidence in lens of sustainable development

Journal

RENEWABLE ENERGY
Volume 197, Issue -, Pages 500-517

Publisher

PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.renene.2022.07.068

Keywords

Evolutionary game theory; Environmental regulation; Green technology innovation stakeholders; Renewable energy demand; Green production mode

Funding

  1. Project for Cultivating Outstanding Top-notch Talents in Universities of Anhui [gxyqZD2022042]
  2. Research Project of Anhui University of Finance and Economics [ACKYB22012, ACKYC22024]
  3. Bengbu Social Science Planning Project [BB22C002]

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This study uses evolutionary game theory to explore the strategic choices and influence mechanisms of green technology innovation under environmental regulations and investigates the long-term impact of green technology progress on renewable energy consumption through simulation. The study found that non-polluting enterprises are more likely to accept environmental regulations and engage in green technological innovation, and that the effects of command-and-control and incentive environmental regulations vary in the short and long term.
Sustainable development goals (SDGs) proposed by the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda in 2015 guide coordinated socio-economic development of all countries. They highlight the importance of environmental protection and renewable energy. Here, evolutionary game theory was used to build green technology innovation activities of the government, public, polluting enterprises, and non-polluting enterprises of a four-group evolutionary game model under environmental regulations to discuss and analyze the strategic stability of each game subject and the influence mechanism of strategic selections. Long-term impact of green technology progress on renewable energy consumption was investigated by simulation. The evolutionary trajectory of the game system of these stakeholders was studied through simulation analysis. Under different environmental regulations, polluting and non-polluting enterprises selected different strategies. Non-polluting enterprises easily accepted environmental regulations and conducted green technological innovation to promote SDGs. The effects of command-and-control and incentive environmental regulations were better in the short- and long-term, respectively. When the compensation intensity of an enterprise to the public was low or medium, the public selected supervision. Further, establishing public participation supervision mechanism could control non-green behavior and increase the renewable energy demand of polluting and non-polluting enterprises. Finally, suggestions were provided to promote green innovation and sustainable development from the perspectives of environmental regulation and collaborative innovation.

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