4.7 Article

Manufacturer's selling mode choice in a platform-oriented dual channel supply chain

Journal

EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS
Volume 198, Issue -, Pages -

Publisher

PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.eswa.2022.116842

Keywords

Online retailing; Platform-oriented supply chain; Selling mode choice

Funding

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [72171182, 71801175, 71902041, 71971182, 72031009]
  2. Theme-based Research Projects of the Research Grants Council [T32-101/15-R]
  3. City University of Hong Kong SRG [7004969]
  4. Ger/HKJRS project [G-CityU103/17]

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This paper examines a platform-oriented dual channel supply chain and investigates how the manufacturer's choice of selling mode impacts the preferences of other supply chain members. The study compares the equilibrium profits in the three selling modes and finds that the manufacturer prefers the direct selling mode when the operating cost is low. Otherwise, the optimal choice depends on the competition intensity and commission rate. Additionally, the paper explores the impact of different selling modes on the profits of the online retailer, platform, and the entire supply chain.
This paper considers a platform-oriented dual channel supply chain (PDCSC), in which the online retailer resells products in a marketplace provided by the platform and the manufacturer chooses a selling mode to introduce a dual channel. Three possible selling modes for the manufacturer are considered: (1) Reselling mode (Mode R); (2) Agency selling mode (Mode A); and (3) Direct selling mode (Mode D). We examine the manufacturer's equilibrium strategy and how this choice affects the other supply chain members' preferences. By comparing equilibrium profits in the three selling modes, we demonstrate that the manufacturer prefers Mode D when the direct operating cost is relatively low. Otherwise, either Mode R or Mode A is optimal, largely depending on the interaction between competition intensity and commission rate. More specifically, if both the competition intensity and commission rate are low, Mode A is the optimal choice; if the competition intensity is low but commission rate is high, Mode R is optimal; if the commission rate is relatively high, the manufacturer should choose Mode R. Finally, we further characterize the influences of the different selling modes on the profits of the online retailer, the platform, and the whole supply chain. We also extend the model by considering the case where the online retailer and platform have equal channel power and set prices simultaneously, the case of Cournot competition, and the case where the platform acts as the channel leader.

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