The strength of weak integrated information theory

The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the 'hard problem', others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.

Automated summary

This article discusses the integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) and argues that by distinguishing between strong IIT and weak IIT, the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly expanded. Strong IIT identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maximum integrated information, while weak IIT tests pragmatic hypotheses that relate aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. The authors review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings can be well explained by weak IIT without committing to strong IIT entirely, and discuss the outlook for both flavors of IIT.