Stochastic differential games for crowd evacuation problems: A paradox

Title
Stochastic differential games for crowd evacuation problems: A paradox
Authors
Keywords
Differential games, Crowd aversion, Evacuation problem, Braess paradox, Semi-explicit solution, Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman PDE system, Receding-horizon control
Journal
AUTOMATICA
Volume 140, Issue -, Pages 110271
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Online
2022-04-01
DOI
10.1016/j.automatica.2022.110271

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