Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH
Volume 55, Issue 9, Pages 2556-2574Publisher
TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2016.1240382
Keywords
Supply chain management; quality management; product harm; post-sale product liability; wholesale price contract
Categories
Funding
- National Sciences Foundation (NSF) of China [71531003, 71272129, 71572040]
- Sichuan Youth Science and Technology Foundation [2013JQ0031]
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This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer (M) and a downstream Retailer (R) who transact intermediate products via a wholesale price contract. The supply chain provides an experience good to unit-demand consumers. M is liable for the harm caused by its products in a low quality state. A two-stage game model is built to describe how the supply chain operates. With the equilibrium and under certain assumptions, this paper finds that (1) in spite that post-sale product liability positively affects the wholesale price, M's quality level, the contracted quantity and supply chain members' profitability are independent of it; (2) when liability-related factors and M's quality improvement efficiency change, the wholesale price serves as a medium for M and R to mutually share the ex ante expected liability cost, the demand loss caused by the ex ante expected consumer harm and the ex ante quality-improving cost; (3) in response to changes in liability-related factors, the quality performance is in conflict with the financial performance for both M and R, but this conflict disappears in the presence of a change in quality improvement efficiency. Managerial insights are also discussed.
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