Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS
Volume 178, Issue -, Pages 82-94Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.04.025
Keywords
Supply chain management; Supply chain competition; Information sharing; Demand forecast
Categories
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71102150, 71390334, 71132008]
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [2013JBM030]
- Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project [YETP0550]
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We study manufacturer-retailer bilateral information sharing in two competing supply chains (SCs), in which both the manufacturer and the retailer have partial information on demand. Based on Bertrand competition model and Winkler's consensus model, we develop a finite Bayesian Stackelberg game to analyze the two-way information sharing problem under horizontal supply chain (SC) competition. In line with the literature, we find that sharing demand forecast voluntarily in a SC benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. However, we find whether SCs benefit from information sharing depends on competition intensity and forecast error. As competition is intensive, the expected values of information sharing (EVISs) for the entire SCs are high. Moreover, information sharing in one supply chain can improve the rival supply chain's EVIS under some conditions. Numerical experiments are conducted to get some managerial insights. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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