Manipulation-resistant false-name-proof facility location mechanisms for complex graphs

Facility location games with optional preference

(2020) Zhihuai Chen et al.   THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE

False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games

(2018) H. Aziz et al.   JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing Lp Norm of Costs

(2017) Itai Feigenbaum et al.   MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH

Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations

(2017) Vincent Conitzer et al.   AI MAGAZINE

False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games: Empirical and Theoretical Analysis

(2016) Ramoni O. Lasisi et al.   COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Heterogeneous facility location without money

(2016) Paolo Serafino et al.   THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE

Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions

(2015) Dimitris Fotakis et al.   ALGORITHMICA

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

(2014) Liad Wagman et al.   INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY

Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks

(2011) Yukun Cheng et al.   THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE

Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions

(2010) Baharak Rastegari et al.   ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks

(2010) Noga Alon et al.   MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH