Journal
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Volume 21, Issue 4, Pages 949-968Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-021-09764-9
Keywords
Delusions; Meaning; Meaningfulness; Phenomenology; Cognitive psychology; Sense of coherence; Creativity
Categories
Funding
- MRC
- MRC [MR/T04618X/1] Funding Source: UKRI
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Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. In fact, in some circumstances they can enhance an individual's sense of meaning and creativity. They can help make sense of one's unusual experiences and support one's endeavors in certain situations.
Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: (1) delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; (2) some delusions can also enhance the sense that one's life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. Rather, they can help make sense of one's unusual experiences and in some circumstances even support one's endeavours, albeit temporarily and imperfectly. Acknowledging that delusions have meaning and can also give meaning to people's lives has implications for our understanding of psychotic symptoms and for addressing the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions.
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