Optimal Attack Strategy Against Fault Detectors for Linear Cyber-Physical Systems

This paper is concerned with the design of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) against fault detectors (FD) for linear cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The purpose of the attacker is to design an stealthy attack scheme such that the defenders cannot detect the faults in time or fail to detect the faults, and at the same time the robustness of the CPS is deteriorated. Unlike the existing optimal attack strategies (OASs) that are established based on sufficient conditions, necessary and sufficient conditions (NASCs) are established to maximize the degradation of the FD performance and robustness of CPS while maintaining stealth. Subsequently, an OAS is constructed by solving coupled backward recursive Riccati difference equations (RDEs). Finally, two simulation examples are employed to show the effectiveness of the designed attack scheme. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier Inc.

Automated summary

This paper focuses on designing false data injection attacks against fault detectors for linear CPSs, aiming to degrade the performance of FD and robustness of CPS while remaining undetected. By establishing necessary and sufficient conditions, an optimal attack strategy is constructed using coupled backward recursive Riccati difference equations, with simulation examples demonstrating its effectiveness.