Journal
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Volume 248, Issue 3, Pages 982-996Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.08.009
Keywords
Double marginalization; Pollution accumulation; Abatement efforts; Supply chain
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This paper seeks to determine how the double marginalization phenomenon affects the tradeoff between polluting emissions and abatement activities related to pollution accumulation in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The environmental consequence of this inefficiency, which emerges in a non-cooperative vertical setting governed by a single-parameter contract, is overlooked in the literature on pollution control. In the setup of a two-stage game, we investigate the impact of double marginalization for non-cooperative equilibrium. To check whether there are differences between dynamic and strategic effects of double marginalization on pollution accumulation, both the open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria are derived over a finite time horizon, with the cooperative solution as a benchmark. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. and Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO) within the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS). All rights reserved.
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