Braess' paradox: A cooperative game‐theoretic point of view

Some properties of transportation network cooperative games

(2019) Giorgio Gnecco et al.   NETWORKS

Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value for Game-Theoretic Network Centrality

(2018) T. P. Michalak et al.   JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

Economic resilience to transportation failure: a computable general equilibrium analysis

(2017) Zhenhua Chen et al.   TRANSPORTATION

An approach to transportation network analysis via transferable utility games

(2017) Yuval Hadas et al.   TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL

Efficient algorithms for game-theoretic betweenness centrality

(2016) Piotr L. Szczepański et al.   ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

A convergent and efficient decomposition method for the traffic assignment problem

(2014) David Di Lorenzo et al.   COMPUTATIONAL OPTIMIZATION AND APPLICATIONS

A heuristic methodology to tackle the Braess Paradox detecting problem tailored for real road networks

(2013) Saeed Asadi Bagloee et al.   Transportmetrica A-Transport Science

Improved network performance via antagonism: From synthetic rescues to multi-drug combinations

(2010) Adilson E. Motter   BIOESSAYS

The negation of the Braess paradox as demand increases: The wisdom of crowds in transportation networks

(2010) A. Nagurney   EPL

A Shapley Value-Based Approach to Discover Influential Nodes in Social Networks

(2010) Ramasuri Narayanam et al.   IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering

Traffic assignment by paired alternative segments

(2010) Hillel Bar-Gera   TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL

Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis

(2009) Yoram Bachrach et al.   AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS

Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling

(2008) Javier Castro et al.   COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RESEARCH