Article
Information Science & Library Science
Gediminas Adomavicius, Alok Gupt, Mochen Yang
Summary: This paper studies the bidder support problem for general multi-item multi-unit (MIMU) combinatorial auctions. Theoretical results are derived to calculate bidder support metrics for MIMU auctions with XOR bids, and it is shown that support results for MIMU auctions with OR bids can be derived from those with XOR bids. The derived theoretical results lead to algorithmic procedures that outperform the commonly used integer programming approach. The insights from general MIMU auctions also extend to auctions with additional bidding constraints.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH
(2022)
Article
Economics
Fernando Martinez-Santos, Zoraida Frias, Alvaro Escribano
Summary: This study aims to identify the main drivers of auction prices for spectrum auctions associated with 4G and 5G technologies in seven European countries. The research finds that mobile operators pay lower auction prices if there are alternative frequency bands used for previous mobile standards, and that auction prices are higher in more concentrated markets, when more licenses are auctioned, and when the CCA format is used.
Article
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Summary: In two-sided markets, maximizing gain-from-trade while maintaining truthfulness, individual-rationality and no deficit is impossible according to Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem. However, approximating maximum gain-from-trade can be achieved through truthful and deficit-free double-sided auctions. Multi-agent categories in multilateral markets offer a more diverse and complex trading environment compared to traditional two-sided markets, with additional requirements such as buyers trading with multiple sellers and sellers trading with multiple buyers.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
(2021)
Article
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Summary: We propose an ascending-price mechanism for multi-sided markets that addresses the issue of multiple intersecting markets, ensuring fairness and balance, and achieving nearly optimal gain-from-trade when the market size is sufficient. We evaluated the performance of this mechanism using real stock market data and synthetic data.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
(2023)
Article
Business
Pankaj Mishra, Ahmed Moustafa
Summary: This research aims to minimize the total cost of procuring multi-units of commodities. A novel decentralised group commodity allocation approach is proposed, which introduces an information diffusion based dual-bid procurement auction mechanism. This mechanism helps buyers reach out to distant sellers and procure commodities at the minimum possible price.
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS
(2022)
Article
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
Simina Branzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen, Yulong Zeng
Summary: Multi-unit auctions are a common model for resource allocation where a seller sells multiple units of a good to buyers with monetary budgets. Walrasian equilibria may not exist in this model, but alternative strategies like envy-free pricing can be used. We propose an envy-free and prior-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets, which provides small constant approximation ratios for both revenue and welfare objectives when the market is mildly competitive. However, truthfulness is incompatible with efficiency according to an impossibility theorem.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
(2023)
Article
Economics
Zhi Li, Pengfei Liu, Stephen K. Swallow
Summary: The use of assurance contracts can significantly increase the probability of public goods provision, group demand revelation, and social welfare, especially for agents with values above the assurance level. A medium level of assurance payment can induce the largest improvement on social surplus.
ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS
(2021)
Article
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
Michele Flammini, Manuel Mauro, Matteo Tonelli
Summary: This study proposes a framework for capturing fair price discrimination policies that can be tolerated by customers, and investigates its application to multi-unit markets. The research explores pricing differences in different national markets and discriminatory forms based on time and purchasers, and discusses the computational complexity of these discrimination policies.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
(2021)
Article
Economics
Shiying Chen, Zhenhuan Dong, Chunming Cao, Changjun Zheng
Summary: This study extends the symmetrical multi-unit auction to the asymmetric private value model by modelling the difference amongst bidders using valuation and marginal utility parameters. It solves the optimal strategy for different bidders, expanding the practical application of multi-unit auction theory. The study evaluates the yield and price volatility of different auction mechanisms under the 'two-group case', and the results show that Vickrey auction is generally superior to uniform price auction, while discriminatory price auction revenue has a larger fluctuation range.
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
(2022)
Article
Management
Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik
Summary: In this paper, we investigate the problem of multi-item profit maximization under an underlying distribution over buyers' values. Due to the unavailability of a full description of the distribution in practice, we focus on the mechanism designer's use of samples from the distribution. By leveraging the shared structure in pricing, auction, and lottery mechanisms, we derive new bounds and optimization tools for mechanism classes not yet explored in the sample-based mechanism design literature.
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
(2023)
Article
Engineering, Electrical & Electronic
Daniel Teixeira, Luis Gomes, Zita Vale
Summary: Peer-to-peer transactions in smart grids can enhance the efficiency of local renewable energy sources, reduce energy costs for end-users, and promote market competitiveness.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
(2021)
Article
Business
Guofang Huang
Summary: In the past two decades, there has been a decline in the use of uniform-price auctions in markets of peer-to-peer lending, equity crowdfunding, and initial public offerings. This article analytically studies why this trend might be occurring and finds that a uniform-price auction leads to more herding and strategic delay of bid submission, resulting in a smaller transaction completion probability and lower expected revenue. These findings are consistent with empirical observations and literature in related markets.
JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH
(2023)
Article
Engineering, Industrial
Yaqiong Liu, Shudong Sun, Xi Vincent Wang, Lihui Wang
Summary: This paper proposes an iterative combinatorial auction mechanism based on a decentralised decision procedure to address the multi-agent parallel machines scheduling problem. The approach generates collaborative scheduling schemes without violating information privacy, and utilizes flexible bidding strategies and a hybrid auction termination condition to ensure convergence and competition among agents. Experimental results show that the approach generates high-quality solutions and outperforms centralized and state-of-the-art decentralised scheduling approaches in improving social welfare, particularly for problems with a large number of consumer agents.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH
(2022)
Article
Economics
Haomin Yan
Summary: This paper proposes a two-stage ascending clock auction mechanism that can dynamically implement the VCG outcome, addressing the issue of multi-unit demands for advertising positions through allocation and assignment stages.
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
(2021)
Article
Information Science & Library Science
Martin Bichler, Johannes Knoerr, Felipe Maldonado
Summary: AWalrasian competitive equilibrium defines a set of linear and anonymous prices, but it is not applicable in nonconvex markets, and there is a loss issue with price-inelastic demand in many electricity markets. However, with the increasing levels of renewable energy, demand-side flexibility becomes more important. We propose a pricing rule to minimize make-whole payments.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH
(2023)
