Journal
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW
Volume 128, Issue -, Pages 333-355Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2019.06.009
Keywords
Service competition; Maritime transport chain; Revenue sharing and service cost allocation contract; Compensation mechanism; Nash bargaining negotiation
Categories
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71402038, 71774019]
- Program for Liaoning Excellent Talents in University [WR2017004]
- Talent Project of Revitalizing Liaoning [XLYC1807097]
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We investigate two competing carriers' incentives of horizontal alliance and values of vertical cooperation in a one-to-two shipping service competition model, where two carriers may form an alliance. We find that forming alliances reduces carrier service competition, lowers port service price, and weakens port's monopolistic advantage. Moreover, a combined contract is proposed that coordinates effectively and brings win-win situation for stakeholders, where carrier (alliance) shares profit with port meanwhile port allocates service cost in return. Also, we identify the contract has a certain robustness. Furthermore, we improve the contract with compensation mechanism by Nash bargaining for better operation.
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