4.2 Article

Optimal contracts under endogenous demand information acquisition

Journal

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
Volume 47, Issue 3, Pages 173-177

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.004

Keywords

Information acquisition; Quantity discounts; Endogenous adverse selection

Funding

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [71672065]

Ask authors/readers for more resources

We consider a supplier selling to a retailer who decides whether or not to exert a fixed cost to acquire private demand information. We show that quantity discounts, established by the extant literature to be the optimal response for exogenous information acquisition, are also optimal under the setting with endogenous information acquisition. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Authors

I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.

Reviews

Primary Rating

4.2
Not enough ratings

Secondary Ratings

Novelty
-
Significance
-
Scientific rigor
-
Rate this paper

Recommended

No Data Available
No Data Available