Incentive Contract Design for the Water-Rail-Road Intermodal Transportation with Travel Time Uncertainty: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Title
Incentive Contract Design for the Water-Rail-Road Intermodal Transportation with Travel Time Uncertainty: A Stackelberg Game Approach
Authors
Keywords
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Journal
Entropy
Volume 21, Issue 2, Pages 161
Publisher
MDPI AG
Online
2019-02-12
DOI
10.3390/e21020161

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