Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans

Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation

(2015) Jun-Zhou He et al.   Scientific Reports

Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma

(2014) Jun-Zhou He et al.   PLoS One

A solution to the collective action problem in between-group conflict with within-group inequality

(2014) Sergey Gavrilets et al.   Nature Communications

When Punishment Pays

(2013) Gilbert Roberts   PLoS One

Punish and Voice: Punishment Enhances Cooperation when Combined with Norm-Signalling

(2013) Giulia Andrighetto et al.   PLoS One

Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

(2013) C. Hilbe et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer's dilemma

(2013) W. Przepiorka et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Resource heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation

(2013) Ádám Kun et al.   Nature Communications

Evolving cooperation

(2012) Martin A. Nowak   JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons

(2012) A. Traulsen et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

(2012) Matjaž Perc   Scientific Reports

THE EVOLUTION OF PUNISHMENT IN n-PLAYER PUBLIC GOODS GAMES: A VOLUNTEER'S DILEMMA

(2011) Nichola J. Raihani et al.   EVOLUTION

Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans

(2011) D. Baldassarri et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COEXISTENCE OF COOPERATION AND DEFECTION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

(2010) Marco Archetti et al.   EVOLUTION

Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons

(2010) Karl Sigmund et al.   NATURE

Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game

(2010) Dirk Helbing et al.   NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS

Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems

(2010) M. A. Janssen et al.   SCIENCE

Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare

(2010) R. Boyd et al.   SCIENCE

Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions

(2010) Dirk Helbing et al.   PLoS Computational Biology

Winners don’t punish

(2008) Anna Dreber et al.   NATURE

Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games

(2008) Francisco C. Santos et al.   NATURE

Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

(2008) Matjaž Perc et al.   PHYSICAL REVIEW E

Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

(2008) R. O'Gorman et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Antisocial Punishment Across Societies

(2008) B. Herrmann et al.   SCIENCE

The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment

(2008) S. Gachter et al.   SCIENCE