4.6 Article

Quantum key-recovery attack on Feistel structures

Journal

SCIENCE CHINA-INFORMATION SCIENCES
Volume 61, Issue 10, Pages -

Publisher

SCIENCE PRESS
DOI: 10.1007/s11432-017-9468-y

Keywords

quantum cryptanalysis; quantum key-recovery; Feistel structure; Simon; Grover

Funding

  1. National Key Research and Development Program of China [2017YFA0303903]
  2. National Natural Science Foundation of China [61672019]
  3. Fundamental Research Funds of Shandong University [2016JC029]
  4. National Cryptography Development Fund [MMJJ20170121]
  5. Zhejiang Province Key RD Project [2017C01062]
  6. China Postdoctoral Science Foundation [2017M620807]

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Post-quantum cryptography has drawn considerable attention from cryptologists on a global scale. At Asiacrypt 2017, Leander and May combined Grover's and Simon's quantum algorithms to break the FX-based block ciphers, which were introduced by Kilian and Rogaway to strengthen DES. In this study, we investigate the Feistel constructions using Grover's and Simon's algorithms to generate new quantum key-recovery attacks on different rounds of Feistel constructions. Our attacks require 2(0.)(25nr)(-0.)(75n) quantum queries to break an r-round Feistel construction. The time complexity of our attacks is less than that observed for quantum brute-force search by a factor of 2(0.)(75)(n). When compared with the best classical attacks, i.e., Dinur et al.'s attacks at CRYPTO 2015, the time complexity is reduced by a factor of 2(0.5n) without incurring any memory cost.

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