Journal
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
Volume 117, Issue 1, Pages 291-297Publisher
AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC
DOI: 10.1037/a0016917
Keywords
grandmother cell; visual perception; memory; sparseness; neural coding
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Funding
- NATIONAL EYE INSTITUTE [R21EY019710] Funding Source: NIH RePORTER
- OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH [DP2OD006461] Funding Source: NIH RePORTER
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council [EP/D052254/1] Funding Source: researchfish
- EPSRC [EP/D052254/1] Funding Source: UKRI
- MRC [G0701038] Funding Source: UKRI
- Medical Research Council [G0701038] Funding Source: Medline
- NEI NIH HHS [R21 EY019710-01, R21 EY019710] Funding Source: Medline
- NIH HHS [DP2 OD006461, DP2 OD006461-01] Funding Source: Medline
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Bowers (2009) challenged the common view in favor of distributed representations in psychological modeling and the main arguments given against localist and grandmother cell coding schemes. He revisited the results of several single-cell studies, arguing that they do not support distributed representations. We praise the contribution of Bowers (2009) for joining evidence from psychological modeling and neurophysiological recordings, but we disagree with several of his claims. In this comment, we argue that distinctions between distributed, localist, and grandmother cell coding can be troublesome with real data. Moreover, these distinctions seem to be lying within the same continuum, and we argue that it may be sensible to characterize coding schemes with a sparseness measure. We further argue that there may not be a unique coding scheme implemented in all brain areas and for all possible functions. In particular, current evidence suggests that the brain may use distributed codes in primary sensory areas and sparser and invariant representations in higher areas.
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