Coordination in Games with Strategic Complementarities: An Experiment on Fixed vs. Random Matching

Published 2012 View Full Article

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Title
Coordination in Games with Strategic Complementarities: An Experiment on Fixed vs. Random Matching
Authors
Keywords
-
Journal
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Volume 23, Issue 2, Pages 221-238
Publisher
Wiley
Online
2012-10-23
DOI
10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01384.x
References
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