The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Title
The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Authors
Keywords
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Journal
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
Volume 280, Issue 1766, Pages 20131475-20131475
Publisher
The Royal Society
Online
2013-07-17
DOI
10.1098/rspb.2013.1475

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