Journal
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
Volume 41, Issue 4, Pages 397-402Publisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.009
Keywords
Queueing; Service competition; Strategic customers; First-mover advantage; Price leadership
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Funding
- Hong Kong GRF [PolyU 543112]
- Israel Science Foundation [1015/11]
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We consider Stackelberg pricing games between two servers with homogeneous customers. We find that a first-mover advantage holds when the demand is large and that a second-mover advantage exists when the demand is scarce. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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