4.2 Article

The equivalence of uniform and Shapley value-based cost allocations in a specific game

Journal

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
Volume 38, Issue 6, Pages 539-544

Publisher

ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2010.08.011

Keywords

Cooperative game; Uniform cost allocation; Shapley value; Core; Group buying

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This paper concerns the possible equivalence of the Shapley value and other allocations in specific games. For a group buying game with a linear quantity discount schedule, the uniform allocation results in the same cost allocation as the Shapley value. In this paper, we explore whether the Shapley axioms can be used to make such connections. We also characterize the functions that result in the equivalence of these two allocations among the class of polynomial total cost functions. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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