Journal
NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS
Volume 12, Issue -, Pages -Publisher
IOP Publishing Ltd
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/12/2/023015
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Funding
- National Basic Research Program of China [2006CB705500]
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [10975126, 10635040]
- Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China [20093402110032]
- Hong Kong University Grants Council [B-Q14G]
- Natural Science Foundation of Anhui, China [KJ2009A49]
- Hong Kong Baptist University
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It is commonly believed that epidemic spreading on scale-free networks is difficult to control and that the disease can spread even with a low infection rate, lacking an epidemic threshold. In this paper, we study epidemic spreading on complex networks under the framework of game theory, in which a voluntary vaccination strategy is incorporated. In particular, individuals face the 'dilemma' of vaccination: they have to decide whether or not to vaccinate according to the trade-off between the risk and the side effects or cost of vaccination. Remarkably and quite excitingly, we find that disease outbreak can be more effectively inhibited on scale-free networks than on random networks. This is because the hub nodes of scale-free networks are more inclined to take self-vaccination after balancing the pros and cons. This result is encouraging as it indicates that real-world networks, which are often claimed to be scale free, can be favorably and easily controlled under voluntary vaccination. Our work provides a way of understanding how to prevent the outbreak of diseases under voluntary vaccination, and is expected to provide valuable information on effective disease control and appropriate decision-making.
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