4.7 Article

Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance

Journal

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Volume 57, Issue 9, Pages 1692-1702

Publisher

INFORMS
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1369

Keywords

channel governance; cooperatives; pooling; foreclosure; market power; incomplete contracts

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Fruit and vegetable marketing organization the Greenery has experienced various governance structure changes, like horizontal merger, forward integration, and the emergence of grower associations. A multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing the interactions between pooling, access, and countervailing power. This model does not only explain the changes at the Greenery, but it contributes also to the design of efficient channel governance.

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