Journal
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY
Volume 66, Issue 7, Pages 1527-1553Publisher
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
DOI: 10.1007/s00285-012-0543-8
Keywords
Epidemiological games; Social distancing; Age structure
Categories
Funding
- National Science Foundation [DMS-0920822]
- Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation [49276]
- National Institutes of Health [PAR-08-224]
- Division Of Mathematical Sciences
- Direct For Mathematical & Physical Scien [0920822] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Epidemiological games combine epidemic modelling with game theory to assess strategic choices in response to risks from infectious diseases. In most epidemiological games studied thus-far, the strategies of an individual are represented with a single choice parameter. There are many natural situations where strategies can not be represented by a single dimension, including situations where individuals can change their behavior as they age. To better understand how age-dependent variations in behavior can help individuals deal with infection risks, we study an epidemiological game in an SI model with two life-history stages where social distancing behaviors that reduce exposure rates are age-dependent. When considering a special case of the general model, we show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium when the infection pressure is a monotone function of aggregate exposure rates, but non-monotone effects can appear even in our special case. The non-monotone effects sometimes result in three Nash equilibria, two of which have local invasion potential simultaneously. Returning to a general case, we also describe a game with continuous age-structure using partial-differential equations, numerically identify some Nash equilibria, and conjecture about uniqueness.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available