The government’s mobilization strategy following a disaster in the Chinese context: an evolutionary game theory analysis

Title
The government’s mobilization strategy following a disaster in the Chinese context: an evolutionary game theory analysis
Authors
Keywords
Disaster mobilization, Nonprofit organizations, Evolutionary game theory, Contractual relationship
Journal
NATURAL HAZARDS
Volume 80, Issue 3, Pages 1411-1424
Publisher
Springer Nature
Online
2015-07-20
DOI
10.1007/s11069-015-1843-2

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