Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

标题
Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
作者
关键词
-
出版物
Nature Communications
Volume 8, Issue -, Pages 13800
出版商
Springer Nature
发表日期
2017-01-13
DOI
10.1038/ncomms13800

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