Reputation Effects in Social Networks Do Not Promote Cooperation: An Experimental Test of the Raub & Weesie Model

标题
Reputation Effects in Social Networks Do Not Promote Cooperation: An Experimental Test of the Raub & Weesie Model
作者
关键词
Prisoners dilemma, Social networks, Game theory, Social influence, Learning, Experimental design, Social communication, Social psychology
出版物
PLoS One
Volume 11, Issue 7, Pages e0155703
出版商
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
发表日期
2016-07-02
DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0155703

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