期刊
CHINESE SCIENCE BULLETIN
卷 57, 期 7, 页码 724-728出版社
SCIENCE PRESS
DOI: 10.1007/s11434-011-4890-4
关键词
prisoner's dilemma game; emergence of cooperation; size of interaction neighborhood
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [60904063, 70871090]
- Tianjin Municipal Natural Science Foundation [11JCYBJC06600, 11ZCKFGX00900]
- Tianjin University of Technology [LGYM200918]
We studied the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where the size of the interaction neighborhood is considered. Firstly, the effects of noise and the cost-to-benefit ratio on the maintenance of cooperation were investigated. The results indicate that the cooperation frequency depends on the noise and cost-to-benefit ratio: cooperation reaches a climax as noise increases, but it monotonously decreases and even vanishes with the ratio increasing. Furthermore, we investigated how the size of the interaction neighborhood affects the emergence of cooperation in detail. Our study demonstrates that cooperation is remarkably enhanced by an increase in the size of the interaction neighborhood. However, cooperation died out when the size of the interaction neighborhood became too large since the system was similar to the mean-field system. On this basis, a cluster-forming mechanism acting among cooperators was also explored, and it showed that the moderate range of the neighborhood size is beneficial for forming larger cooperative clusters. Finally, large-scale Monte Carlo simulations were carried out to visualize and interpret these phenomena explicitly.
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