Monitoring mechanisms in new product development with risk-averse project manager

标题
Monitoring mechanisms in new product development with risk-averse project manager
作者
关键词
New product development, Monitoring mechanism, Information asymmetry, Incentive contract, Uncertainty theory
出版物
JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENT MANUFACTURING
Volume 28, Issue 3, Pages 667-681
出版商
Springer Nature
发表日期
2014-11-03
DOI
10.1007/s10845-014-0993-5

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