Ultrafast initiation of a neural race by impending errors

The brain makes decisions by means of races between neural units representing alternative choices, and such models can predict behaviour in decision tasks in a precisely quantitative way. But what is less clear is how soon after the stimulus the race actually starts. In the present study, we re-visit a complex decision experiment: the Wheeless task, in which a saccadic stimulus is followed after a short delay by a second stimulus, with the subject sometimes making a saccade to the first, now inappropriate, stimulus, and sometimes going straight to the correct one. We demonstrate that a simple model with three accumulator units, two 'Go' and one 'Stop', can then account in detail for the individual responses made, as well as their timing. This complex decision-making behaviour is predicted directly for each individual subject by their performance in a simple step saccadic task, which identifies the two free parameters that are specific for each subject. By contrast to previous assumptions, we find that it is necessary for the onset time of the Stop unit to be shorter than for Go by 10-20 ms. This suggests a specifically fast mechanism for altering responses in situations where urgent action is needed to prevent an impending error.