4.7 Editorial Material

Delusions and misbeliefs

期刊

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
卷 32, 期 6, 页码 517-517

出版社

CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X09991191

关键词

-

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Beliefs may be true or false, and grounded or ungrounded. McKay & Dennett (M&D) treat these properties of belief as independent. What, then, do they mean by misbelief? They state that misbeliefs are simply false beliefs. So would they consider a very well-grounded belief that is false a misbelief? And why can't beliefs that are very poorly grounded be considered delusions, even when they are true?

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.7
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据