期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
卷 8, 期 3, 页码 559-586出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s13194-018-0201-0
关键词
Principle of indifference; Bayesianism; Epistemic consequentialism; Accuracy
资金
- UK Arts and Humanities Research Council
- Leverhulme Trust
- AHRC [AH/M005917/1] Funding Source: UKRI
This paper presents a new argument for the Principle of Indifference. This argument can be thought of in two ways: as a pragmatic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold if one is to minimise worst-case expected loss, or as an epistemic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold in order to minimise worst-case expected inaccuracy. The question arises as to which interpretation is preferable. I show that the epistemic argument contradicts Evidentialism and suggest that the relative plausibility of Evidentialism provides grounds to prefer the pragmatic interpretation. If this is right, it extends to a general preference for pragmatic arguments for the Principle of Indifference, and also to a general preference for pragmatic arguments for other norms of Bayesian epistemology.
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