4.6 Article

Eternal inflation: when probabilities fail

期刊

SYNTHESE
卷 198, 期 SUPPL 16, 页码 3853-3875

出版社

SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-1734-7

关键词

Cosmology; Eternal inflation; Inductive logic; Probability

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The passage discusses the challenges in making inductive inferences over pocket universes in eternal inflating cosmology. While definite probabilities cannot be determined, a non-probabilistic inductive logic can still be applied, which does not preclude all predictions but limits those useful for deciding on eternal inflation.
In eternally inflating cosmology, infinitely many pocket universes are seeded. Attempts to show that universes like our observable universe are probable amongst them have failed, since no unique probability measure is recoverable. This lack of definite probabilities is taken to reveal a complete predictive failure. Inductive inference over the pocket universes, it would seem, is impossible. I argue that this conclusion of impossibility mistakes the nature of the problem. It confuses the case in which no inductive inference is possible, with another in which a weaker inductive logic applies. The alternative, applicable inductive logic is determined by background conditions and is the same, non-probabilistic logic as applies to an infinite lottery. This inductive logic does not preclude all predictions, but does affirm that predictions useful to deciding for or against eternal inflation are precluded.

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