期刊
RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND RECYCLING
卷 131, 期 -, 页码 297-304出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2017.10.012
关键词
Closed-loop supply chain; Consumer's preference; Game theory; Nash bargaining
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71373157, 71403120]
- Doctoral Innovation Foundation of Shanghai Maritime University [ycx2016074]
- Doctoral Excellent Thesis Project Foundation of Shanghai Maritime University [2016BXLP005]
This paper aims to explore the decision strategy and profit distribution of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with retail price and emission reduction dependent demand. In the first period, the manufacturer supplies the new products to retailer and the retailer sells the new products to consumers; then the retailer remanufactures the used products and purchased the new products in the second period. Considering the consumer's low-carbon and remanufactured preference, centralized and decentralized models consisting of one-single manufacturer and one-single retailer are proposed to investigate the optimal retail price, reduction rate and recycling rate. Through systematic comparison, the results show that each member makes decisions for self-profits maximization, which inevitably brings about double-marginal effect and affects the operating efficiency of supply chain in decentralized scenario. On the basis of Nash bargaining theory, we use the degree of satisfaction as an objective function and examine the feasibility of coordination mechanism. Finally, a numerical study is taken to investigate the impacts of low-carbon and remanufactured preference on demand as well as optimal decisions.
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