Effects of monitoring and incentives on supplier performance: An agency theory perspective

标题
Effects of monitoring and incentives on supplier performance: An agency theory perspective
作者
关键词
Monitoring, Incentives, Supplier performance measurement and management, Agency theory, Survey
出版物
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS
Volume 203, Issue -, Pages 322-332
出版商
Elsevier BV
发表日期
2018-07-08
DOI
10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.07.008

向作者/读者发起求助以获取更多资源

Reprint

联系作者

Publish scientific posters with Peeref

Peeref publishes scientific posters from all research disciplines. Our Diamond Open Access policy means free access to content and no publication fees for authors.

Learn More

Create your own webinar

Interested in hosting your own webinar? Check the schedule and propose your idea to the Peeref Content Team.

Create Now