4.8 Article

Distributed Load Sharing Under False Data Injection Attack in an Inverter-Based Microgrid

期刊

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS
卷 66, 期 2, 页码 1543-1551

出版社

IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TIE.2018.2793241

关键词

Cyberattacks; distributed load sharing; false data injection (FDI); microgrids

资金

  1. National Nature Science Foundation of China [61503147]
  2. Australian Research Council [DP120104986]
  3. National Nature Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province [BK20171264]
  4. University Science Research General Project of Jiangsu Province [15KJB510002]
  5. Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China [Y16F030011]
  6. Lianyungang Science and Technology Project [CG1501]
  7. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability

向作者/读者索取更多资源

In microgrids, distributed load sharing plays an important role in maintaining the supply-demand balance of power. Because false data injection (FDI) is one of the crucial threats faced by future microgrids, the study of the impact of FDI on distributed load sharing is both of theoretical merit and practical value. In this paper, we consider the distributed load sharing problem of the microgrids operating in autonomous mode under FDI. Each bus is assumed to be equipped with an agent. Under a well-developed distributed load sharing protocol based on multiagent systems, we first construct an FDI attack model, where the attacker is capable of injecting false data into the bus agents. Then, a utilization level is introduced for co-ordinating generators, and its variation is evaluated in the presence of FDI attacks with given injection strategies. The stable region of the microgrid is defined, and conditions are given to determine stability. Finally, theoretical results are validated on the Canadian urban distribution system.

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